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OSHA AT THE THRESHOLD: SETTING




How can a regulatory body determine the level at which expo-
sure to a carcinogen is no longer healthful without reliable scien-
tific data? OSHA's policy of refusing to recognize a safe
exposure level in the absence of data has been recently scruti-
nized by the United States Supreme Court in its decision rejecting
a new benzene standard. This Comment defends zero level expo-
sure as something more than an ad hoe agency policy determina-
tion. In fact, OSHA's experience regulating carcinogens
demonstrates that an understanding of what it is that is not
known can serve as a valuable basis for sound policy making.
INTRODUCTION
Responding to the growing national concern about cancer,1 the
1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act2 (OSH Act) grants the
Secretary of Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) authority to control workplace carcinogens.3
1. For a description of Americans' "exceptional fear" of cancer see Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration, Identification, Classification and Regula-
tion of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5016 (1980) (codified
in C.F.R. § 1990) [hereinafter cited as OSHA Cancer Standard].
2. Pub. L No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678).
3. OSH Act § 6(b) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1970) requires the Secretary to
promulgate permanent standards to protect employees from "toxic materials or
harmful physical agents".
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Identification and assessment of the risks caused by various car-
cinogens, however, have presented problems in the application of
the statute.4 One area of difficulty has been OSHA's attempts to
promulgate standards that establish safe or permissible exposure
levels for known carcinogenic substances.5 Complex questions of
scientific and quantitative analysis necessarily involved in setting
safe exposure levels have challenged OSHA and, eventually, re-
viewing courts.6
The determination whether or not the Secretary has satisfacto-
rily performed his scientific homework within the dictates of the
statute has been hindered by legal disagreement over the stat-
ute's meaning7 and, even more perplexing, by the non-existence
of the data needed to formulate standards. The lack of scientific
certainty surrounding OSHA's attempts to set permissible expo-
sure levels for a known carcinogen is traceable to three major
sources. Foremost, the void in the scientific understanding of can-
cer mechanisms frustrates most meaningful evaluation of risk, es-
pecially in the causation context.8 As a result of this limited
comprehension, attempts to predict effects at low level exposure
from data of high level exposure are usually unreliable.9 Finally,
4. The Secretary infers his statutory obligation to consider available scientific
data on the effects of a workplace carcinogen at various dosage levels from several
subsections of the OSH Act. Section 6(b) (5), limits the authorization to regulate
substances "to the extent feasible, on the basis of best available evidence." An-
other provision requires the Secretary to determine the priority for the establish-
ment of standards according to "the urgency of the need for mandatory safety and
health standards" in endangered occupational settings. OSH Act § (6)(g), 29
U.S.C. § 655(g) (1970). Additionally, the Supreme Court's interpretation that OSH
Act § (3) (8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1970) applies to § 6(b) (5) requires the Secretary to
use quantitative analysis in making a threshold finding that standards are "rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate" to control significant risks to employees. Indus-
trial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2864 (1980)
(plurality opinion) [hereinafter cited as American Petroleum Inst.].
5. Substances may play many different roles in the evolution of a cancer and
OSHA has adopted a broad definition of the term carcinogen to include both direct
and secondary causal substances. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5022
(1980).
6. For a summary of how disputes on these questions have delayed the com-
pletion of regulations for selected agents see OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note
1, at 5011-12.
7. The Secretary is assigned the demanding task of applying scientific data to
a statute whose key quantifiers are "adequately," "extent," "best available" and
"material," OSH Act § 6(b) (5), 29 U.S.C. 655(b) (5) (1970). The interpretation of
each of these terms has been central to judicial review of OSHA standards. E.g.
United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall (D.C. Cir. No. 78-1562, decided August
15, 1980), published in 3 EMPLOYMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) § 24, 717,
at 30, 371 (1980) (discussion of "material impairment"); American Petroleum Inst.
v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1978) (interpretation of "most adequately as-
sures" and "best available evidence"); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodg-
son, 499 F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (interpretation of "to the extent feasible").
8. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5016-29.
9. Id. at 5178-200.
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the fact that carcinogenic risks will only manifest themselves in
the distant future inspires widespread disagreement in the scien-
tific community about the accuracy and usefulness of various re-
search techniques.O Few prospective studies exist to guide
standard promulgations."1
In response to this scientific uncertainty, OSHA has settled on
the theory that where available scientific data cannot establish a
safe level of exposure for an occupational carcinogen, no safe
level should be recognized at all.' 2 Accordingly, OSHA has pur-
sued a regulatory policy that strives for zero-level exposure,' 3 lim-
ited only by considerations of feasibility.' 4 This policy was at the
heart of OSHA's defense of its benzene standard challenged in In-
dustrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum In-
stitute.15 A sharply divided Supreme Court rejected the benzene
10. Id. at 5035-78.
11. Id. at 5036.
12. Id. at 5137.
13. OSHA did not immediately endorse zero-level exposure policy. In promul-
gating standards for exposure to asbestos dust in 1972 and fourteen related carcin-
ogens in 1974, OSHA found that no safe level of exposure could be determined.
Nevertheless, it set the asbestos dust level with great sensitivity to industry cost
and time necessary for technical compliance. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001; OSHA, Stan-
dard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972). See Industrial
Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In the case of the
fourteen related carcinogens, OSHA sought a standard that would avoid eliminat-
ing the use of materials and production techniques that OSHA considered invalua-
ble to industry. OSHA ordered controls to generally reduce the fourteen
carcinogens' exposure levels "to the maximum extent practicable consistent with
continued use". 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1003-.1006 (1977); OSHA, Standard for Carcino-
gens, 39 Fed. Reg. 3756 (1974). See Synthetic Organic Mfgs. Assn. v. Brennan, 506
F.2d 385, 390 (3d Cir. 1974). Beginning with the vinyl chloride standard set in 1974,
OSHA more aggressively pursued its no safe level exposure policy. See Berger
and Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Sub-
stances Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 Ecoi L.Q. 285, 311-18
(1978).
14. To interpret feasibility, OSHA looks to language in § 6(b) (5) bidding the
Secretary consider "the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety pro-
tection for the employee," a legislative history implying Congressional under-
standing of the adverse costs to industry involved, and judicial precedent. See
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(costs feasible even though economically burdensome). According to these
sources, the feasibility limitation emphasizes the status of technology available to
help industry to comply with the new permissible exposure level. See American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 832-35 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 100 S.
Ct. 3054, dismissal granted, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980) (discussion of technological feasi-
bility). Economic burdens to industry are to be measured only by whether the
level set would impose "massive economic dislocation" of the industry as a whole.
American Federation of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1975).
15. 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
standard. A four member plurality held that OSHA's present ap-
proach to setting permissible exposure levels needed to be recon-
sidered in light of OSH Act section 3(8)'s requirement that OSHA
demonstrate that any standard it promulgates is reasonably nec-
essary and appropriate to curtail significant health risks to em-
ployees. The issue remains, however, whether there are
circumstances where OSHA can still enforce a no safe level of ex-
posure standard in the absence of meaningful scientific data.
This Comment will examine the nature of the scientific uncer-
tainty that complicates precision in setting permissible exposure
levels for carcinogens under the OSH Act. OSHA's policy for
dealing with these uncertainties, as represented by its Cancer
Standard, will then be compared to the legal factual findings re-
quired by the plurality opinion in American Petroleum Institute
as a prerequisite to standard promulgation. The future of OSHA's
attempts to set exposure levels depends on the partnership the
courts and the agency create to confront scientific issues. This
Comment will encourage reviewing courts to yield to OSHA's ex-
pertise in analyzing, interpreting, and applying complex scientific
data, thereby enhancing OSHA's efficiency.
THE NATURE OF THE SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
Cancer Mechanisms and Causation
However incomplete scientific understanding of cancer might
be, OSHA in its proceedings to set standards has heard much ex-
pert testimony that keeps the agency up to date with the current
state of cancer research and knowledge.16 Cancer is a general
term used to describe a proliferation of abnormal cells that invade
normal tissue in the human body.'7 A brief summary of the cur-
rent theories about the origins of cancer will reveal why it is so
difficult to apply quantitative risk assessment or legal causation
principles.
Cancer appears to result from a cell or cells which have been
transformed by changes in or damage to DNA or other genetic
material.18 Cell self-replication causes an irreversible growth pat-
tern of aberrant cells that sometimes are capable of invading nor-
mal tissue. The cancerous cell growth has three characteristics:
cell multiplication, invasiveness, and autonomy.19 Invasiveness
can be a matter of the abnormal cells destroying solid tissue, or a
16. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5005-08 (description of the rule-
making procedure).
17. Id. at 5016.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 5017 (testimony of Dr. Francis C.J. Roe).
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condition in which the accelerated growth rate of new cells so ex-
ceeds the destruction of old ones that an invasive state exists.
Whereas a particular body organism normally oversees the devel-
opment and growth of its member cells, the cancerous cell multi-
plication displays autonomy in defying that control mechanism.
OSHA has endorsed the common theory "that most cancers
have multiple 'causes' and that it therefore would be simplistic to
assign to each a single causative agent."20 In fact, scientists are
looking at three separate roles an individual substance might per-
form in the cancer mechanism. 21 The agent might directly initiate
neoplastic (tumorous) cell transformation by acting on the DNA
or other genetic structure of a normal cell. Other substances
might participate as "promoters" or "co-carcinogens" by, for ex-
ample, activating a latent virus. Lastly, a third group of agents
might enhance the metabolic activation of an existing carcinogen,
accelerating the development of cancer cell lines by modifying
hormone levels or suppressing the immune mechanism.22 Conse-
quently, the evaluation of a particular carcinogen's contribution to
the causation of cancer is likely to resemble the most intricate
proximate cause problem. The pathological development of can-
cer to a point of clinical recognition is an evolutionary process. At
each evolutionary stage, different substances can play a signifi-
cant role in furthering the cancer's development. This role may
also be played by environmental factors surrounding the condi-
tion of the host (affected) cell.23
A corollary of the multiple cause theory is the great probability
that a combination of substances, if not factors, cause cancer.24
Some poignant examples are found in prospective studies that
have compared the occurrence of lung cancer in smoking and
non-smoking workers exposed to asbestos for long periods. One
study showed no reported deaths from lung cancer among the
eighty-seven non-smokers as compared to twenty-four deaths for
the two hundred eighty-three men with a smoking history.25
Causal factors appear to be able to interact either: additively, as
20. Id. at 5017.
21. Id. at 5018 (testimony of Dr. Arthur Upton).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 5020.
25. Id. at 5020-21 (based on 1967 study of New York metropolitan area asbestos
workers).
the sum of the individual risks; synergistically, as in the asbestos-
smoking example where the additional causes have multiplying
effect upon the risk, or even antagonistically, with individual
causal factors cancelling one another out.26 There is little use or
accuracy in an assessment of an individual carcinogen's risk po-
tential outside the context of these other potential contributing
factors.27 Thus, the basic features of carcinogenesis defy quanti-
tative risk assessment.
The theory of single-cell origin or the initiation of the cancer
from the interaction of a single molecule of the carcinogen with
the DNA or genetic material in a single cell seriously challenges
the idea that there are any safe levels of exposure.28 Accordingly,
OSHA concludes in its Cancer Standard: 'This (concept) is of
profound importance for the concept of threshold dose."29 Irre-
versibility theory suggests that the final cell transformation is
caused by a series of related steps. A dose of one carcinogenic
agent causes a partial and irreversible change in the cell structure
which only results in a cancer through subsequent changes
caused by exposure to another agent or several more agents.3 0
This theory leads OSHA to opine: 'The importance of these find-
ings for the regulation of carcinogens is that even brief exposures
early in life may be assumed to have irreversible effects which
may be manifested as cancers late in life."31 One explanation for
the greater incidence of cancer in the elderly is that the individu-
als have had a longer time to go through all the steps necessary
for a complex cell transformation. 2 Again, such unpredictable
and delayed manifestation complicates the regulation of occupa-
tional carcinogens.
Finally, latency periods frustrate causation analysis of cancer.
Latency is defined as the time between exposure to the carcino-
gen and the manifestation of the cancerous effect.33 Such latency
periods are suspected to last between five and fifty years.3 4 This
basic characteristic of cancer, the fact that in trying to control it
26. Id. at 5020.
27. Id. at 5022. This is a basic deficiency in the use of animal studies to estab-
lish permissible exposure levels.
28. Id. at 5023-24. There is great disagreement in the scientific community
about the validity of the single-cell theory. See American Petroleum Inst., 100 S.
Ct. 2844, 2861 n.41 (1980).
29. OSHA Cancer Standard, .supra note 1, at 5023, 5024.
30. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5024 (testimony of Dr. Stewart).
31. Id. at 5025.
32. Alternatively, some experts argued that cancer is a disease of old age be-
cause natural selection has only led to the evolution of defense mechanisms for
early ages. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5026.
33. Id. at 5026.
34. Id. at 5040 (testimony of Dr. Hoover).
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we are grappling with some future, unknown risk, is a most apt
demonstration of why carcinogen regulation by definition is a hit
or miss proposition.
Cancer Study Techniques and Exposure Levels
Whatever the difficulties in cancer risk assessment, cancer pol-
icy-making under the OSH Act must be based on "the best avail-
able evidence." 35 To meet this requirement, OSHA has utilized
three kinds of studies: epidemiological studies that review histo-
ries of human reactions to carcinogens, laboratory experiments
on animals called animal bioassays, and a variety of short-term
tests done on isolated single cells.36
Although properly conducted epidemiological studies provide
the most reliable indicator of whether a substance is a carcinogen,
they are inadequate measures of potency.3 7 Analyses of the histo-
ries of occupational groups exposed to the carcinogen in question
necessarily occur in, uncontrolled circumstances, and conse-
quently are fraught with confounding variables and uncertainty.38
Because scientists cannot control or understand outside causa-
tion factors affecting both those employees exposed to a particu-
lar carcinogen and those who are not, these studies are poor
indicators of lower level risks.39 Likewise, latent manifestation of
effects make epidemiological studies that describe recent expo-
sures inconclusive. Moreover, there is an obvious limit to the
specificity with which histories report the levels and circum-
stances of the occupational exposures.40 Oftentimes the data con-
tains errors or is simply unobtainable. Finally, because they
cannot regulate exposure to carcinogens from the onset, scientists
cannot control and study relevant risk factors. These include
worker socio-economic status, age at exposure, smoking histories,
35. OSH Act § 6(b) (5), 29 U.S.C. 655(b) (5) (1970).
36. See Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental
Carcinogens, 4 HARv. ENvr'L L. REV. 86, 91 (1980). The technology of short term or
in vitro tests has only recently emerged and their reliability is as yet questionable.
OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5173.
37, Leape, supra note 36, at 96.
38. Id. at 92.
39. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5040 (testimony of Dr. Hoover).
40. E.g., American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. at 2854 (1980) (validity of key ep-
idemiological study supporting benzene standard challenged for errors in specific-
ity of exposure of subject group).
reporting errors, and other workplace and domestic influences.41
Animal bioassays avoid many of the weaknesses in epidemio-
logical studies, providing the controlled experimentation essential
to a focus upon the isolated effects of a single carcinogen.42 If
multiple cause, irreversibility, and synergistic interaction theories
are valid, however, the precise advantages of animal studies raise
complex questions as to their accuracy when extrapolated to
humans. An employee's exposure to a particular level of carcino-
gen is not in isolation; other causal factors should not be dis-
counted. Oftentimes, because the concern is to produce
qualitative data quickly and cheaply, animal test-subjects are in-
jected with the maximum dose tolerated by OSHA, making the
tests of limited value in assessing permissible exposure levels.43
Similarly, there is uncertainty about the validity of analogies
between different organisms. The test animals might differ from
man in how they absorb chemicals through their gastrointestinal
tracts, the length of time they store absorbed compounds, their
rates of body metabolism, their rates and routes of excretion, and
in the quality of the cellular and inter-cellular membranes that in-
teract with the carcinogen initiating the cancer growth.44 Combin-
ing these factors with the environmental differences in exposure,
the inbred aspect of most animal test populations, and the rela-
tively small size of animal test samples, creates uncertainties that
must be carefully considered for proper quantitative risk assess-
ment.45
Dose Response Curves
The final uncertainty plaguing OSHA's attempts to set permis-
sible exposure levels concerns the use of available statistical data
to predict a safe level. The impetus for setting the new permissi-
ble exposure level (p.e.l.) might come from recent outbreaks of
cancer in workers exposed to a carcinogen, or from scientific re-
search determining a substance is carcinogenic and needs regula-
tion, or from new scientific data or beliefs that an existing p.e.l.
standard poses a risk to employee health.46 In all cases, the car-
41. Some scientists believe that epidemiological studies could be used to
check whether incidences of cancer have in fact occurred at low level exposures
and, consequently, to determine no effect levels. See OSHA Cancer Standard,
supra note 1, at 5047.
42. See Leape, supra note 36, at 95.
43. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5142 (testimony of Dr. Harold
Stewart).
44. Id. at 5190-91 (citing 1977a The Safe Drinking Water Commission, National
Academy of the Sciences, 32-36, 41-42).
45. Id. at 5189.
46. In the case of the benzene standard, for example, the National Institute of
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cinogen regulator must use data of risks at higher exposure levels
to predict what lower level of exposure is the threshold of safety
from the occurrence of cancer. The common tool for statistical
analysis of this sort is the dose response curve.47 Unfortunately,
keen disagreement exists over the proper method for making a re-
liable dose response curve.48 The vast discrepancy in the results
coming from the varying statistical techniques has spawned spec-
ulation whether dose response curves can predict threshold levels
at all.49 This has been reinforced by current causation theory that
even low level exposure is adequate to initiate cell transforma-
tion.50 The respected'scientific support for this position has had a
profound impact in the formation of OSHA's present policy that
without adequate data on low level exposures, there is no deter-
minable safe level of exposure at all.51
OSHA's P.E.L. POLICY-MAKING AND JUDIcIAL REVIEw
Among those agencies concerned with environmental and occu-
pational carcinogens, considerable differences have arisen in the
policy devised for use of quantitative data.52 Some of these differ-
ences are attributable to the different statutory language and re-
spective legislative histories authorizing each agency's powers.
For example, although OSHA's obligation to regulate carcinogens
"to the extent feasible" forces it to consider technological and ec-
onomic feasibility, the Food and Drug Administration is told to
consider health effects alone.5 3 Other differences in use of quanti-
tative data are attributable to the varying nature of the regulatory
Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) discovered a new study of low level ex-
posure related leukemia deaths that it felt justified a change in the permissible ex-
posure level. See 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918 (1978).
47. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5184, 5197.
48. Three common mathematical extrapolation models are:, the probit, that as-
sumes each member in society has a threshold tolerance level to the given agent;
the single hit, that calculates the random chances of the inter-action of the mole-
cule and lost cell; and the multi-stage, that calculates the likelihood of the suspect
molecule playing a role in some cancer forming process. Expected response rates
at low doses for the same tested agent vary according to the model from 1 in a
billion responses to 7 in a thousand. See OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at
5185, Table 3.7.
49. Id.
50. See note 40 supra.
51. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5118-37.
52. See OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5195-97; Leape, supra note 36,
at 109-13.
53. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1976).
tasks. The magnitude of the Environmental Protection Agency's
job of overseeing numerous low level exposures makes even
crude quantative risk assessments imperative for setting regula-
tory priorities.5 4
Part of the difference appears to be philosophical. Among the
agencies, OSHA is the most aggressive supporter of the no safe
level of exposure policy for known carcinogens.55 Whatever scien-
tific bases underly OSHA's endorsement of no safe level policy,
the economic burdens of such a policy have placed OSHA in the
forefront of the political battle on regulation.56 OSHA has dug in
and chosen to defend its policy based on authority delegated to it
by the 1970 legislation and by scientific data.
On January 22, 1980, OSHA published its Cancer Standard.5 7
Noting the history of the agency's prolonged and frustrated at-
tempts to regulate potential occupational carcinogens, the stan-
dard represents OSHA's determination to settle policy questions
repeatedly disputed in substance regulation proceedings.58 The
advantages of an overall cancer policy are obvious. The Supreme
Court has encouraged agencies to promulgate general rules that
will guide agency discretion in individual cases.5 9 By establishing
the procedures and grounds for carcinogen regulations, and the
bases upon which those regulations may be challenged, the
agency avoids the waste of time, money and human resources in-
54. "The extrapolation of cancer risks to very low levels of exposure is un-
doubtedly more useful to EPA than OSHA. In the general environment, exposure
to carcinogens can commonly be very low and involve large populations. In the
occupational setting the potential for exposure is always high." Testimony of Dr.
Albert of the Environmental Protection Agency. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra
note 1, at 5198.
55. See Toxic SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMMITTEE, Toxic CHEMICALS AND PUB-
LIC PROTECTION 135 (Report to the President, May, 1980).
56. See De Long, Benzene Exposes Workers to Unresolved Issues, LEGAL TIMES
WASH. D.C. Sept. 8, 1980, at 40, 44 Ross, Time to Regulate the Regulators-And
Place the Blame on Congress, NAT'L L.J., May 12, 1980, at 24, col. 1; Zerner, Cancer
Policy: Extreme Regulatory Philosophy, LEGAL TIMES WASH. D.C., Feb. 4, 1980, at
10, 11. See also Statement on Executive Order No. 12,044, Improving Government
Regulations, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 562 (Mar. 23, 1978) (President Carter
ordered agencies to make regulations that limit economic burdens on the private
sector).
57. Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Car-
cinogens, OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1.
58. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health has identified
over 2,400 agents as "suspect carcinogens" and projected that 271 of those are
likely to meet the Cancer Standard's Category 1 criteria for regulation. Yet since
its creation in 1971 OSHA has only completed regulatory action on twenty agents.
See OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5029. For a summary of the delays
and time involved in completing regulations of selected agents see OSHA Cancer
Standard, supra note 1, at 5011-12.
59. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978).
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herent in repetitious litigation. Likewise, it avoids the risk of in-
consistent interpretations and determinations on the same facts
by different courts. From OSHA's point of view, such a policy is
essential to improve the efficiency of carcinogen regulations.60
OSHA used notice and comment rule-making procedure to col-
lect extensive and conflicting expert testimony on major issues
surrounding quantitative risk assessment. 61 This record provided
the support for three types of policy determinations OSHA made
to govern future carcinogen regulation proceedings. First, OSHA
determined the degree of reliability it was going to attribute to
various kinds of human, animal, and cellular studies of exposure
levels.62 Parties could thereafter know in advance how useful a
particular study would be as evidence supporting or opposing a
proposed exposure level. Second, OSHA specified the statistical
methods it found most useful for determinations of low level ef-
fects. 63 These methodological preferences were dependent upon
the quality of data to be analyzed and OSHA's decision that it is
obligated by statute to estimate conservatively on behalf of em-
ployee protection.64 Third, the Cancer Standard established how
data and statistical interpretations would be used in the regula-
tory process. OSHA concluded that "the uncertainties involved in
extrapolating from high-dose animal experiments to predict low-
dose risks to humans are far too large at present to justify using
the estimates as the basis of quantitative risk/benefit analysis."6
5
60. In her speech to the Construction Advisory Committee at its December 16-
17, 1980 meeting in Washington D.C., outgoing Assistant Secretary of Labor, Direc-
tor of OSHA, Eula Bingham said her greatest disappointment during her tenure
was the seeming impossibility of streamlining standards promulgation procedure.
Reported in EMPLoYMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH GuIDE (CCH) No. 503, Dec. 30, 1980,
at 2.
61. See note 17 supra.
62. For example, OSHA considered the reliability of comparisons between
mutagenic and carcinogenic potencies. Since data on the former is more easily ob-
tained, an established correlation to carcinogenic potency might make better pre-
dictions available on level exposure risks to humans. Since the correlation has not
yet been confirmed, OSHA determined it would be premature to consider muta-
genic studies in setting p.e.l. See OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5199-
200.
63. For example, OSHA considered and rejected the use of time-to-event mod-
els in statistical risk assessments. These studies sought to understand the effects
of a dose by looking at the period of time between exposure and manifestation of
the cancer. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5187-88.
64. Id. at 5010-11.
65. Id. at 5200. For an argument that the OSHA Cancer Standard is defective
in that it makes no attempt to quantify the risks see Caruso, Industry Responsibil-
Assuming adequate data exists, risk assessment might be used
for two purposes: to predict relative risks in establishing priori-
ties, and to estimate reduction in risks from agency action.66
OSHA likewise reviewed in great detail evidence whether
"safe," "no-effect," or "threshold levels" could be established for
an identified carcinogenic substance.67 The issue is not merely
whether quantification of a threshold level is possible, but also
whether a threshold level of exposure to carginogens below which
no harm will occur even exists. 68 OSHA's conclusion that "even if
thresholds for specific carcinogens could be demonstrated for cer-
tain human individuals, no reliable method is known today for es-
tablishing a threshold that could apply to a group of workers" was
bitterly disputed by some experts.
6 9
OSHA frequently points out that its analysis and conclusions
are based on careful consideration of the record and supportable
by substantial evidence therefrom.70 Nonetheless, the standard
has been challenged by industry and labor alike in four circuit
courts and one district court.71 Those actions have been consoli-
dated in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.72
ity for Environmentally Caused Cancer Under The Toxic Substances Control Act, 7
RUTGERs J. COmPUTERS, TECH. & L. 213, 229 (1979).
66. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5201.
67. See generally OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5118-37.
68. The principle that a dose must exist below which a toxic agent is ineffec-
tive comes from toxicology. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5124.
69. OSHA supported its conclusion based on its interpretation of the evidence
on six points: (1) The mechanisms of carcinogenisis are distinct for other toxico-
logical processes where thresholds have been determined. If the single carcino-
genic molecule's interaction with a single cell initiates the cancer process, the
threshold must be determined at the cellular levels. Given the differences in cell
environments in individuals, thresholds for a population become even more diffi-
cult to determine. (2) Not enough is known about protective mechanisms (immu-
nities, DNA repair, metabolism rates, hormone levels) to assure us that threshold
data is conclusive. (3) The existence of certain bionutrient chemicals essential to
human existence at low levels but carcinogenic to animals at high doses does not
prove thresholds exist. (4) The current attempts to demonstrate thresholds for
specific carcinogens are few and inconclusive. (5) Models based on the inverse
relationship between dose levels and time of latency manifestation are not at pres-
ent developed sufficiently to be applicable to humans. (6) Interaction of car-
cinogenic and environmental factors in causation nullifies the validity of threshold
tests of one carcinogen carried out on animals. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra
note 1, at 5124-37. Some experts argued that although single-cell origin theory
might be plausible, there must still be a minimum number of molecules present at
the host cell before there is a chance of initiation occurring. Id. at 5131 (summary
of expert testimony).
70. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5137.
71. Challenges to the Cancer Standard in the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals were consolidated in the Fifth Circuit
along with an appeal of a district court decision affirming the Cancer Standard as
a standard within the meaning of the OSH Act. See note 72 infra.
72. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, appeal docketed, Nos. 80-3018, 3040,
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One issue on appeal is whether the Cancer Standard is a stan-
dard within OSH Act's meaning, or instead a regulation or a gen-
eral policy governing OSHA's performance. 73 Industry will
question whether OSHA's general standards on quantitative risk
assessment and no safe exposure levels are supported by sub-
stantial evidence and allowable in light of the Supreme Court's
decision on the benzene standard in American Petroleum Insti-
tute .74
American Petroleum Institute
Alongside the promulgation of and challenge to the OSHA Can-
cer Standard has been the troubled history of the agency's stan-
dard altering permissible exposure levels for airborne benzene.75
The Fifth Circuit of Appeals rejected the standard in 1978.76 Two
years later, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's de-
cision, but on a variety of grounds, none of which garnered the ex-
press support of five Justices.77 American Petroleum Institute
3042,3057 (5th Cir., Sept. 15, 1980); American Indus. Health Council v. Marshall, 494
F. Supp. 941 (S.D. Tex. 1980), appeal docketed (5th Cir., Sept. 15, 1980).
73. Letter from George H. Cohen, counsel for AFL-CIO, (December 30, 1980).
74. Conversation with Diane E. Burkley, Dep't of Labor Attorney, January 9,
1981.
75. Standard for Exposure to Airborne Benzene, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (codified in
29 C.F.R. 1910.1028) (1978) [hereinafter cited as OSHA Benzene Standard]. Long
recognized for producing chronic effects in workers, benzene is a liquid that evap-
orates rapidly under ordinary atmospheric conditions. Workers are exposed to it
in its production, in its use as an intermediate for the production of other chemi-
cals, as a solvent in a variety of chemical and production industries, and as a reac-
tant in chemical laboratories. The American National Consensus Institute
adopted a benzene exposure standard that set a 10 ppm eight hour averaged expo-
sure limit, with 25 ppm ceiling concentration and 50 ppm excursions for ten-min-
ute periods. All of the National Consensus standards were adopted as the federal
standards pursuant to OSH Act § 6(a). Benzene was recognized as a potential
cause of non-malignant blood disorders, chromosome damage, and leukemia.
In 1974 NIOSH recommended the peak concentration limit period be lowered to
25 ppm. On the basis of a 1976 epidemiological study of workers thought to have
been exposed to 0-15 ppm benzene at two Plioflim plants between 1940-1949, NI-
OSH recommended a new standard be set for 1 ppm, with 5 ppm ten minute ceil-
ings and 25 ppm peak concentrations. An emergency standard adopted on
NIOSH's advice was stayed by the Fifth Circuit on May 27, 1977. A similar perma-
nent standard was the subject of industry challenge and eventually the Supreme
Court's first attempt to review an OSHA carcinogen standard. See American Pe-
troleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980); EMPLOYMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH GuiDE
(CCH) 12,305-306 (1978) for a history of benzene regulation.
76. 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 440 U.S. 906 (1979).
77. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980). Justice Powell joined Jus-
tice Steven's plurality opinion except for the section that dealt with the burden of
discusses in the context of an individual substance many of the
issues raised and resolved generally in the Cancer Standard. Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion striking down the standard, however,
failed to address any of these grounds. His call for the resurrec-
tion of the unlawful delegation doctrine seems to indicate a disin-
clination to support legislative-like policy decisions, such as those
made in OSHA's Cancer Standard, until clearer Congressional au-
thority is expressed.78 Consequently, any four Justices agreeing
OSHA has erred in setting permissible exposure levels are likely
to prevail. Although American Petroleum Institute leaves much
unresolved and the extent of its general applicability is uncertain,
the case cannot be ignored in future standard promulgation.
The Lack of Appropriate Findings
The four member Supreme Court minority flatly rejected the
Fifth Circuit's holding that the Secretary must determine whether
the benefits of the new standard were reasonably related to its
costs.7 9 Justice Powell's concurrence endorsed an interpretation
of "feasibility" requiring justification of costs by a determination
of benefits as indispensable to "any rational system of regula-
tion."80 The plurality opinion of Justice Stevens, however, de-
ferred the issue of cost/benefit analysis.81 Something more basic
was wrong with the findings underlying the change in the ben-
zene standard.
OSHA was alerted to the need to change the standard by an
alarming epidemiological study from NIOSH. Although OSHA
proof question, which he discussed in his concurring opinion. He also opined that
OSHA should be held to cost/benefit justification of its standards under the feasi-
bility language. Chief Justice Burger joined the plurality opinion completely, but
wrote a concurring opinion saying the Court's detailed scrutiny should not be con-
strued as meaning the Court was going to stop giving OSHA great leeway in mak-
ing essentially legislative judgments. Justice Rehnquist provided the fifth vote for
the judgment, but on the grounds that the pertinent OSH Act section feasibility
language was an unconstitutionally broad and ambiguous grant of legislative au-
thority. Justice Marshall filed the opinion on behalf of the four dissenters, arguing
that OSHA's new benzene standard was supportable with substantial evidence.
78. Justice Rehnquist states:
In the case of a hazardous substance for which a "safe" level is either
unknown or impractical, the language of § 6(b) (5) gives the Secretary ab-
solutely no indication where on the continuum of relative safety he should
draw his line. Especially in light of the importance of the interests at
stake, I have no doubt that the provision at issue, standing alone, would
violate the doctrine against uncanalized delegations of legislative power.
100 S. Ct. at 2881. See also, Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
79. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. at 2894, 2898 n.27, 2903 (1980) (dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Marshall).
80. Id. at 2878 (concurring opinion of Justice Powell).
81. Id. at 2850.
[voL 18: 633, 19811 Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
later determined the statistical basis of the study was flawed as to
the actual exposure levels of the subject group, the results con-
firmed what OSHA already believed 82-- no safe or threshold level
is known to exist for benzene, and OSHA should therefore elimi-
nate the risk to the extent feasible.
Conclusive, undisputed evidence indicated that benzene was a
carcinogen.83 The studies of benzene were all based on epidemi-
olgoical studies.84 OSHA found deficient the epidemiological
studies offered by industry both as proof of "no effect" levels and
as a basis for a determination of threshold; primarily because the
studies failed to adequately define the composition of the "co-
hort" or studied groups.85 The lack of careful definition of the ex-
posed cohort was exacerbated by incomplete histories and
followup of cohorts.8 6 Furthermore, the study's usefulness was
diluted by failures to account for latency8l or the variability of in-
dividual sensitivity. OSHA reiterated its policy that "no effect"
studies had to be held to higher standards of accuracy; conse-
quently, the methodological problems noted were amplified.88
Finally, OSHA reviewed all studies introduced in the proceed-
ing in light of the fact that much is unknown about the relation-
ship between benzene exposure and leukemia. Early evidence
provided contradictory indications about the following issues in
benzene's causation mechanism: whether it participated as a pri-
mary, co-carcinogen or a pro-carcinogen; 89 the extent of special
sensitivity demonstrated by specified age groups, individuals with
prior benzene exposures, and individuals with a history of blood
diseases 90 and what kind of decline in incidences of leukemia re-
82. See OSHA Benzene Standard, supra note 75, at 5921, 5932.
83. Id. at 5931.
84. Id. at 5927-29. For an unknown reason, animal bioassays have not uncov-
ered any clear-cut occurrences of leukemia and, therefore, are inapplicable.
85. Id. at 5931.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 5930. Specific studies supported the finding that benzene has a con-
siderable latency period between exposure and effects.
88. Id. at 5932.
89. Id. at 5929. One epidemiological study specifically found coke oven emis-
sions and benzene synergistically interacted in increasing risks of leukemia.
90. Id. at 5929. Industry maintained that because the evidence of the occur-
rences of potential benzene related leukemia was tied with peculiar characteris-
tics of individuals, the actual risk attributable to benzene was reduced. OSHA
found the fact that benzene might act in the presence of these special sensitivities
actually increased the need for the standard.
suit from cessation of worker exposure.9 1 OSHA concluded that
uncertainties about the actual number of expected benzene-re-
lated deaths and about the theories for extrapolating such data
from existing studies placed quantitative risk assessment on the
"frontiers of scientific knowledge."92 There, agency discretion and
expertise should prevail.
In reviewing OSHA's findings in support of the benzene stan-
dard, the plurality in American Petroleum Institute was non-
plussed by OSHA's discussion of the insufficiency of the data. By
overemphasizing the unavailability of hard facts, OSHA neglected
other approaches to the problem. The plurality criticized OSHA
for not discussing the possibility of making "rough estimates" of
risks at high-level exposures if more complete epidemiological
and animal studies were made. These estimates could then be
extrapolated to make other, rougher estimates of risks at low-
level exposures.9 3 The plurality implied that OSHA was underes-
timating science's predictive powers.
The plurality took a fresh, independent look at the two studies
OSHA primarily relied upon in deciding to promulgate the 1
p.p.m. level.94 The Ohio Pliofilm plant studies which had initiated
concern over the existing 10 ppm levels were discarded because
there had been erroneous information about the population sam-
ple's exposure.9 5 OSHA merely concluded the lack of definitive
data prohibited it from deriving any conclusions about excess
risks at any specific exposure levels. Nevertheless, OSHA still
felt the study raised valid suspicions about potential low-level ex-
posure hazards.9
6
The plurality likewise took issue with OSHA's interpretation of
a Dow Chemical study of 2 to 9 ppm benzene exposures that
showed three leukemia-related deaths versus 0.2 expected deaths
in a sample of 594 workers. 97 Again, OSHA's position was equivo-
cal: the study was not conclusive evidence of increased risks be-
low 10 ppm exposures, but one could not rule out the benzene
exposure's role as a causal factor in the three deaths.9 8 The plu-
rality conclusion on the study was:
[I]t could not be viewed as proof of a relationship between low-level expo-
sure and leukemia because all three workers had probably been occupa-
tionally exposed to a number of potentially carcinogenic chemicals at
91. Id. at 5930 (hereinafter cited as the Askoy Study).
92. Id. at 5940.
93. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. at 2859 n.33.
94. P.p.m. refers to parts of the toxic substance per million parts of air.
95. See OSHA Benzene Standard, supra note 75, at 5926, 5927.
96. Id. at 5927-29.
97. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. at 2860.
98. Id.; OSHA Benzene Standard, supra note 75, at 5928 n.8.
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other points in their careers and because no leukemia deaths had been
uncovered among workers who had been exposed to much higher levels of
benzene. 99
The plurality plunged right into the controversy over how to prop-
erly utilize inconclusive scientific data and when to reject data for
uncertainty. Sometimes it is singularly unimpressed by OSHA's
conclusions that uncertainties belie the value of a study. At other
times, however, the plurality displays great dexterity in showing
why uncertainties render studies inadequate proof. Dismissing
the proof content of these studies, the plurality gets to the heart
of its discontent with OSHA's finding:
In the end OSHA's rationale for lowering the permissible exposure limit
to 1 ppm, was based not on any finding that leukemia has ever been
caused by exposure to 10 ppm and that it will not be caused by exposure
to 1 ppm, but rather a series of assumptions indicating that some leuke-
mias might result from exposure to 10 ppm and that the number of cases
might be reduced by reducing the exposure level to I ppm.100
OSHA had changed the benzene exposure standard from 10
ppm to 1 ppm using the following analysis: benzene is a known
carcinogen; since the industry failed to prove any threshold level
of safety and there was no other evidence available, the agency
assumed any level above zero presents an increased risk of expo-
sure. OSHA then applied a safety factor of 10/100 to the existing
standard, assuming it was a known level of danger, thereby arriv-
ing at the 1 ppm figure. Finally OSHA ordered a study to see if
industry compliance at 1 ppm was technologically and economi-
cally feasible.' 0 '
The dispute between the plurality and OSHA breaks down to
two groups of issues: (1) what is a finding and whether OSHA
made any in support of the benzene standard,102 and (2) who is to
determine whether the scientific data is adequate and accurate
enough to be used as findings and how is the determination to be
made. The plurality implies the findings it wants are studies and
99. 100 S. Ct at 2860.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Justice Powell thought the plurality's conclusion that OSHA had not even
attempted to carry its burden of proof was too harsh. He saw the issue as whether
substantial evidence supported OSHA's finding that quantification techniques are
too imprecise to permit useful risk estimates, and stated the question was a close
one. Because the plurality did not seem to consider the status of the evidence as
relevant to the required findings, the implication was that there could be no regu-
lation without quantification of the risks. 100 S. Ct. at 2876-77 (concurring opinion
of Justice Powell).
quantitative risk estimates based on the studies. OSHA found in
its rule-making, however, that all the studies were inadequate to
assess risk at specific levels.10 3 Likewise, OSHA believes its find-
ings were based on analysis of expert testimony that no safe level
of benzene exposure could be determined'0 4 and that dose-re-
sponse curves could not be extrapolated from existing data to es-
tablish a threshold.10 The Supreme Court called these
determinations general policy "assumptions."106
Given the independent and detailed review of the scientific data
made by the plurality, the issue of who should determine the ade-
quacy and usefulness of such data looms even larger in future
regulation. One searching and valuable study of science policy
questions has made a useful attempt to distinguish the varieties
of scientific questions as a preliminary step to determining the ju-
dicial and administrative decision-making role. 0 7 It identifies
four categories of questions: (1) where there is an impossibility
of reliable determination, the issue is trans-scientific and any de-
cision is purely one of public policy; (2) where the data is insuffi-
cient, but eventually obtainable, and the issue is whether to
postpone determination until complete data may be obtained; (3)
where there are varying scientific interpretations of adequate
data; (4) where there is agreement on the interpretation of the
data, but differences exist as to the inferences or predictions to
draw from such data.108 Depending on the available data, these
questions range from ones of pure policy to ones of pure scientific
fact. One might expect the judiciary to give greater deference to
agency policy setting.
The study classifies questions about no effect levels or the de-
sign of a dose-response curve as trans-scientific.10 9 Because of
the impossibility of obtaining adequate facts, agencies should be
encouraged to make policies that ensure the consistent resolution
of questions that arise repeatedly in litigation.11o Nevertheless,
the plurality in American Petroleum Institute is not easily con-
vinced that issues of benzene's low-level effects are beyond the
103. OSHA Benzene Standard, supra note 75, at 5941.
104. Id. at 5927-29.
105. Id. at 5932.
106. 100 S. Ct. at 2860 (OSHA benzene standard based on a "series of assump-
tions.") The plurality's opinion that these assumptions were not policies based on
findings did not stop the plurality from later disputing and substituting its own
findings on questions of scientific analysis and technique. See note 128 infra.
107. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in the Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in the EPA and
OSHA, 67 GEo. L. REv. 729 (1979).
108. Id. at 733-47.
109. Id. at 757.
110. Id.
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possibility of reliable determination. The Court may not have felt
that OSHA studied these possibilities with the thoroughness re-
quired by the statute to justify its decision that no safe threshold
could be determined. If the latter interpretation is correct, then
maybe a generic cancer policy can still survive American Petro-
leum Institute.
The Requirement of a Threshold Determination of
Significant Risk
The plurality determined that OSHA should have made "rough"
risk estimates, at least as a part of a preliminary inquiry as to
whether a new benzene standard was justified.111 This does not
mean, however, that the agency must use such an estimate in the
final choice of a permissible exposure level. Such a conclusion
could certainly be inferred from the plurality requirement that
OSHA not only show a significant risk of harm at the existing 10
ppm level but also show the likelihood that the new 1 ppm level
will lessen the risks.112
In its determination that section 3(8) must be incorporated into
section 6(b) (5)-meaning that a promulgated standard must be
"reasonably necessary" in the face of a significant risk-the plu-
rality left open the possibility that it was discussing a proof re-
quirement prior to and separate from the promulgation of a
health standard.
Only after the Secretary had made the threshold determination that such
- a risk exists with respect to a toxic substance, would it be necessary to
decide whether § 6(b) (5) requires him to select the most protective stan-
dard he can consistent with economic and technological feasibility, or
whether, as respondents argue, the benefits of regulation must be com-
mensurate with the costs of implementation. 1 13
In support of its interpretation of section 3 (8), the plurality noted
section 6(g)'s requirement that the Secretary establish priorities
for his standards based on urgency,1 4 and section 6(b) (8)'s re-
quirement that the Secretary explain how changes in existing
standards "better effectuate" the purposes of the Act.115 Both
111. 100 S. Ct. at 2859 n.33.
112. 100 S. Ct. at 2870.
113. 100 S. Ct. at 2863; see also 100 S. Ct. at 2864 (before promulgation the Secre-
tary is required to find significant risks present and can be eliminated). The word-
ing suggests there might be a distinction between the quantification required to
justify promulgation and that required to determine the standard.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 655(g) (1970).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(8) (1970).
these requirements address themselves to the determination
whether the standard needs to be promulgated. This might be
distinguished from a determination of how the final standard is
selected, or what level of exposure is permissible. In the latter
situations, the pressure on the Secretary to quantify risks might
decrease.
Perhaps the plurality is not so convinced that OSHA clearly
mishandled the quantitative data in the benzene proceedings as it
is apprehensive about the potential consequences if OSHA's reg-
ulatory approach is generally applied. The plurality foresees
OSHA gaining "unprecedented power over American industry" in
regulating occupational carcinogens.1 6 OSHA could easily con-
clude that a substance is probably a human carcinogen. It would
then immediately conclude the substance poses some regulatable
risk of harm no matter how small the level of exposure, without
regard to contrary evidence. Given the enormous number of po-
tential occupational carcinogens with minute levels of exposure,
perverse regulatory policy would result, trying to eliminate all
risks at outrageous costs. 117 This discussion bears ominously on
the future of the OSHA Cancer Standard. At one point, the plu-
rality even concludes that the generic cancer policy proves its
doomsday scenario "is not merely hypothetical."118 But the plu-
rality's summary of the Cancer Standard is exaggerated on at
least two points: (1) the ease with which the quantum of proof
can be met to justify categorization of a substance as a priority
carcinogen1 9 and (2) the extent to which industry would be fore-
closed from providing or OSHA itself would ignore reliable data
on safe exposure levels. One hopes the Court will get a chance to
examine the Cancer Standard in greater detail.
120
Burden of Proof
The OSHA Cancer Standard would place the burden of proof on
industry to establish a safe level of exposure for a known carcino-
116. 100 S. Ct. at 2865.
117. Id. at 2866.
118. Id. at 2866 n.51.
119. See OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5001-5296. The Cancer Stan-
dard goes to great lengths to analyze the kind of scientific data available and the
extent of its reliability in making the qualitative determination of whether or not a
substance is carcinogenic. Given the time and costs it takes to develop studies to
satisfy the Standard's requirements, the plurality's connotation in the phrase "cer-
tain quantum" is simplistic.
120. See note 72 supra. It seems quite likely that the Supreme Court will even-
tually review the Cancer Standard. See De Long, Benzene Exposes Workers to Un-
resolved Issues, LEGAL TI ES WASH. D.C., Sept. 9, 1980, at 47, col 3, n.3.
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gen.121 In American Petroleum Institute, however, the plurality
assumed that OSHA, as the proponent of the new benzene stan-
dard, had the burden of supporting it with substantial evidence
under the Administrative Procedure Act.122 The problem is defin-
ing "the burden of proving significance of the risk in a case...
where scientific knowledge is imperfect and the precise quantifi-
cation of risks is therefore impossible."123 Again the plurality's
framing of the issue implies that OSHA refrains from quantitative
analysis merely because "precise quantification is impossible."
OSHA's claim is not merely that precision is impossible, but that
the current level of sophistication in the quantitative analysis of
most carcinogens is useless or useful only to the extent that the
imprecisions and uncertainties are carefully accounted for.124
Once this imprecision is demonstrated, OSHA switches the bur-
den of proof on safe exposure levels to the opponents of the stan-
dard.125 The plurality saw only that OSHA was unreasonable in
its demand for precision and held that OSHA had not even at-
tempted to meet its burden of showing the significant risk ben-
zene posed.126
OSHA's grounds for rejecting an industry dose-response curve
showing a risk of two deaths per 30,000 workers every six years
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1990.111(h); Judge Leventhal's discussion of Congressional in-
tent in allocating the burden of proof under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1012-18
(D.C. Cir. 1977) concluded that "burden of proof" is a general term applicable to
all the nuances of burden. Therefore, the plurality's "more likely than not" stan-
dard is discussed as the burden of proof. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. at
2869.
122. Administrative Procedure Act, § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). This would be so
unless the OSH Act provided otherwise. It is important to note that Justice Pow-
ell did not accept, and Justice Rehnquist did not discuss, the plurality's discussion
on the burden of proof question. In fact, Justice Powell and the four minority
members seem to agree OSHA does not always have to meet its burden by quanti-
fying the risks involved. This would be so where OSHA demonstrated such quan-
tification cannot be done reliably. Justice Powell, however, muddles the issue by
requiring the Secretary to support with substantial evidence the finding that the
existing exposure level poses a significant risk. Can that be done without quanti-
tative risk assessment? Justice Powell's support of cost/benefit analysis also de-
tracts from his discussion on the burden of proof question. American Petroleum
Inst., 100 S. Ct. at 2876-77.
123. 100 S. Ct. at 2869.
124. See OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5200, 5201 (OSHA's conclu-
sions on the use of quantitative risk assessments).
125. See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
126. 100 S. Ct. at 2869-70.
were held inadequate.127 The plurality's marked inconsistency in
emphasizing uncertainties in order to discredit the studies sug-
gesting low-exposure risks, while holding OSHA's emphasis on
uncertainties unfounded in the case of industry's dose-response
curve, is explained primarily by its preference for extrapolations
from data of high exposure risks. In this instance, the plurality is
susceptible to a charge that it has substituted its own judgment in
an area where the agency would normally be thought to have
greater expertise.128
The plurality, however, left the door open for a different inter-
pretation of why OSHA's findings on the dose-response curves
failed-OSHA had not adequately explained the reasons for rejec-
tion. OSHA's explanation did not make it clear whether it be-
lieved that the risk of low-level exposure was greater than the
industry curve showed, that the low-level risks established were
significant, or that it was compelled under the statute to establish
the most protective standard feasible.129 American Petroleum In-
stitute invalidates only the third rationale. Furthermore, the plu-
rality's discussion did not make clear if OSHA would be allowed
to support with substantial evidence a fourth reason for rejection
of the curve-that it was too unreliable to be used in setting a
p.e.l.130
Finally, the plurality discussed more generally the impact of its
holding upon OSHA's standard promulgation. Saying that the
term "significant" was not a mathematical "straight-jacket," it
placed upon the agency the initial responsibility and discretion to
determine what "significant" risk means in this complicated area
of science.131 The plurality allowed that "one in a billion" odds
were not significant, but one in a thousand might be.132 Thus the
plurality's main objective appears to be to force OSHA to become
bolder in its use of imperfect data.
The plurality opinion briefly refers to appellate decisions in the
1970's that held OSHA could not be required to support its find-
ings and standards with anything approaching scientific cer-
tainty.133 Although one might debate whether the plurality
opinion gave OSHA leeway on findings made "on the frontiers of
127. Id.
128. See 100 S. Ct. at 2890 (minority opinion of Justice Marshall discussing plu-
rality's arrogance in making its own factual findings).
129. 100 S. Ct. at 2870.
130. But see 100 S. Ct. at 2876-77 (concurring opinion by Justice Powell) (even
where Secretary finds it impossible to precisely quantify, he may still find there is
a significant health hazard).
131. 100 S. Ct. at 2871.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2871; Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson 499 F.2d 467, 476
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science" or in fact mandates exploration, the passing approval of
Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson and Society of Plas-
tics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA is crucial to future attempts to regu-
late carcinogens.134 The agency remains free to use conservative
assumptions in interpretation of scientific data and to err on be-
half of worker protection so long as such assumptions are "sup-
ported by a body of reputable scientific thought."135
In conclusion, the plurality urged OSHA to use its own experi-
ence and judgment in quantitative risk assessment to make deci-
sions about significant risks associated with exposures to
carcinogens.13 6 It suggested that where the agency was faced
with less than reliable data, OSHA should proceed more cau-
tiously in reducing the p.e.l. In the meantime, the agency could
do more monitoring and medical testing to determine if further
reductions were justified. In support of these ideas,137 the plural-
ity cited as a model OSHA's experience in the regulation of coke
oven emissions, which like the benzene standard, was supported
primarily on the basis of epidemiological studies.13
8
AFTER AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
American Iron and Steel
Those who anticipated American Petroleum Institute would re-
solve the controversial question whether OSHA must base its reg-
ulation of carcinogens on some type of cost/benefit analysis were
disappointed by the decision.13 9 Disappointment gave way to re-
newed anticipation, however, when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review OSHA's coke oven emission standard in
American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA 140 on the same day it
announced American Petroleum Institute. Since American Petro-
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
134. 100 S. Ct. at 2871.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2872.
137. Id.
138. See 41 Fed. Reg. 46742 (1976); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577
F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3054, dismissal granted, 101 S. Ct. 38
(1980).
139. E.g., Benzene Case Avoids Cost-Benefit Issue, LEGAL TIMES WAsH. D.C.,
July 7, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
140. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 825; see note 122 infra at
825.
leum Institute seemed to approve of OSHA's use of scientific find-
ings in promulgation of the coke oven standard, the Court was
expected to address the cost/benefit issue directly.141 This expec-
tation never materialized, however, because the industries in-
volved found they had already substantially complied with the
standard.142 The Supreme Court granted industry's petition for
dismissal soon after the grant of certiorari. 43
American Iron and Steel Institute still offers a useful contrast to
American Petroleum Institute.144 Not bound by American Petro-
leum Institute's requirement there be a threshold finding of sig-
nificant risk by the Secretary, the Third Circuit framed the
question as whether there was substantial evidence supporting
the Secretary's conclusion that the ambient atmosphere of a coke
oven maintains particulate matter for which there is no safe expo-
sure level. With remarkable brevity the court determined that the
Secretary offered substantial evidence in the form of expert testi-
mony that present knowledge could not establish safe levels. 45
The court's focus remained on the legitimacy of the agency's as-
sertion that uncertainties precluded predictions; it did not feel its
proper role was to push the Secretary to make quantitative pre-
dictions where he found the data insufficient. Although legal doc-
trine in American Iron and Steel is now suspect, its example of
judicial review of science policy making remains available.
Whether the factual underpinnings of the coke oven emissions
141. 100 S. Ct. at 2871-72 n.64.
142. Conversation with Diane E. Burkley, Labor Dep't Attorney, Jan. 9, 1981.
143. 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980). The Supreme Court has subsequently agreed to re-
view challenges to OSHA's cotton dust exposure standard and it is again expected
to confront the cost/benefit issue. Among questions presented are: (1) Should the
Court resolve the conflict between the District of Columbia Circuit and the Fifth,
Sixth and Seventh Circuits as to the showing OSHA must make to demonstrate its
standards are economically feasible? (2) Can the statutory requirement that com-
pliance with the OSHA standard is "economically feasible" be satisfied by the
agency's conclusion that the standard will not put affected industry out of busi-
ness? (3) Should the Court resolve the conflict between the District of Columbia
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit as to whether the Act, construed as a whole, requires
OSHA to demonstrate that the standard is reasonably necessary and that there is
some reasonable relationship between the benefit sought to be secured from stan-
dards and the cost of obtaining them? AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. granted sub. nom., American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v.
Marshall, 48 U.S.L.W. 3626 (1980) (argued January 21, 1981).
144. As with benzene, the OSHA standard proposed to change the National
Consensus standard for the p.e.l. adopted in 1971. As it is authorized to do by stat-
ute, OSHA established a Standards Advisory Committee on Coke Oven Emissions
to prepare recommendations for a new standard to protect employees. After a re-
view of the Advisory Committee's May 1975 report, the Secretary determined that
there was no safe level of exposure and moved on to a consideration of feasibility
in arriving at the final p.e.l. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at
829, 830.
145. Id. at 832.
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should serve as a model for future carcinogen regulation by
OSHA is likewise disputable.46 The standard was supported by
an unusually careful prospective epidemiological study that had
reviewed exposures among workers for approximately twenty
years. Based on that and other studies, OSHA was able to make
what it considered a reliable dose-response curve to assess low
level risks. Industry experience while awaiting the court chal-
lenge proved the feasibility of the standard. 47 Little basis re-
mained to challenge the p.e.l., even under cost/benefit analysis.
The availability of such reliable scientific data is rare in OSHA's
experience. To condition the decision to regulate upon the exist-
ence of evidence like that in the coke oven emissions proceedings
would seriously impair efforts to reduce occupational cancers.
Regulatory decisions must be made in advance of understanding
of cancer causation mechanisms and risks. As OSHA states in
the Cancer Standard, "the regulation of carcinogens must be an-
ticipatory in nature: it is not justifiable to wait until manifesta-
tions of toxicity are observed, because by then a whole generation
of workers may have been exposed."' 48
United Steelworkers
Almost one month after American Petroleum Institute was de-
cided, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in United
Steelworkers v. Marshall, made the first attempt to apply the
Supreme Court's opinion to a review of an OSHA standard.149
The court made a lengthy review of numerous procedural and
substantive challenges to OSHA's promulgation of a new lead
standard.o50 It recognized that the Supreme Court's divisiveness
in American Petroleum Institute, combined with a certain lack of
clarity in the plurality's discussion of OSHA's approach to the
benzene standard, left many doctrinal matters unresolved.15'
146. See note 142 supra.
147. See note 142 supra.
148. OSHA Cancer Standard, supra note 1, at 5001, 5026.
149. United Steelworkers v. Marshall [1980] 3 EMPLOYMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH
GumiD (CCH) § 24,717 (D.C. Cir. No. 78-1562, decided Aug. 15, 1980) [hereinafter
United Steelworkers]. The Supreme Court has since granted a stay for the OSHA
lead standard pending filing and disposition of petitions for certiorari. 49 U.S.L.W.
3424 (1980).
150. Judge Wright's opinion plus Judge McKinnon's dissent covered well over
100 pages.
151. See United Steelworkers, supra note 149, at 30,368 n.87.
Therefore, American Petroleum Institute's factual underpinnings
were used as a touchstone for the pre-enforcement review of lead.
It was easier to determine what the plurality found clearly unac-
ceptable about the benzene standard than to interpret what the
decision required as adequate support for a standard.
In the court's assessment, the American Petroleum Institute
plurality found three major flaws in OSHA's promulgation of the
benzene standard: (1) OSHA insisted on relying on rigid and cat-
egorical assumptions about benzene's health risks, rather than at
least attempting to interpret the available specific evidence or
hard facts to assess benzene's harm at different exposures; 5 2 (2)
the burden OSHA placed on industry to rebut the presumption
that no safe level of exposure for benzene existed was virtually
impossible to meet; 5 3 and (3) OSHA relied on data of high level
exposures to show qualitatively that benzene was a carcinogen,
but refused to use the data to predict the significance of risk be-
cause it had too many uncertainties. 5 4 OSHA merely assumed
that lowering the p.e.l. to as near zero as possible would likely
produce "appreciable" benefits.
With an eye for these flaws, the court had no difficulty finding
that the p.e.l. in the lead standard was supportable by substantial
evidence. The lead standard was not merely concerned with
preventing deaths attributable to leukemia, but with a wide vari-
ety of malignant and non-malignant, clinical and sub-clinical
harms that OSHA could consider significant. 55 This meant the
categorical assumptions of the Cancer Standard did not even ap-
ply. OSHA found evidence of significant harms that were scientif-
ically observable at specific blood-lead levels. 56 The dispute
between OSHA and industry was not over the availability or ade-
quacy of the data, but over how to interpret the data on sub-
clinical effects-high blood-lead levels-for the potential for
clinical health effects. 57 The court afforded OSHA great discre-
tion in assessing the significance of those sub-clinical effects.
Finding that the criteria of American Petroleum Institute had
been met, the court next considered the feasibility question.58
One key distinction between the benzene standard and the lead
standard is that the latter is based on observable scientific evi-
dence. This lends credence to the belief that American Petroleum
152. Id. at 30,367.
153. Id. at 30,368.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 30,369.
156. Id. at 30,369-71.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 30,380-417.
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Institute demonstrates a judicial unwillingness to tolerate regula-
tion founded upon unquantified and uncertain scientific evidence.
Nevertheless, the United Steelworkers' court correctly deferred to
OSHA's interpretation of the meaning of observable sub-clinical
effects, in terms of potential health danger. It demonstrated a
style of judicial review characterized by reluctance to tamper with
OSHA's assessment of the risks involved.
CONCLUSION
OSHA has fought an uphill battle in gaining approval for its
Cancer Standard.'5 9 American Petroleum Institute imposes the
additional burden of a threshold finding of significant risk as a
prerequisite to standard promulgation.160 Furthermore, OSHA
must at least reconsider its burden of proof allocation in those sit-
uations where it would determine that the unavailability of relia-
ble scientific data warrants application of OSHA general policy
conclusions.161 The section on quantitative risk assessment niust
likewise be altered to allow appropriately designed dose-response
curves to be used to determine significant risks.162 Finally, so
long as courts reserve the right to freely substitute their own de-
termination whether or not the scientific data is uncertain enough
to justify the agency's reliance upon the Cancer Standard's poli-
159. OSHA offered the first form of the Cancer Standard for notice and com-
ment on January 17, 1977. American Petroleum Institute has already had an im-
pact on the OSHA Cancer Standard. OSHA has proposed deletions and additions
to the final standard to make it conform to the plurality opinion. President Rea-
gan's Executive Order of January 29, 1981 froze these changes for sixty days, al-
lowing the President's Task Force of Regulatory Relief opportunity to review
them. The Task Force approved the deletions and withdrew the additions. Exec-
utive Order No. 516, [1981] EMPLOYMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH GUmE (CCH) 1. The
main thrust of the deletions was to eliminate the binding requirement that the ex-
posure level for Category I (or identified) carcinogens be set at the "lowest feasi-
ble level" achievable through engineering and work practice controls. Exposure
levels would once again be set on a substance-by-substance basis, without a gen-
eral policy. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1990.111 (h), (j), 1990.142 (a) (2) (iii), as amended by 46
Fed. Reg. 4892 (1981). The proposed additions, which would have required notice
and comment rulemaking procedure, would have inserted a requirement that Cat-
egory I carcinogen exposure levels be set at the "lowest feasible level which is rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate to eliminate significant risk." Proposed
amendment to 29 C.F.R. § 1990.111 (h), 46 Fed. Reg. 7403 (1981). If the Supreme
Court should determine the cost/benefit issue against OSHA, still another change
will delay the court challenge to the Cancer Standard.
160. Conversation with Diane E. Burkley, Dep't of Labor Attorney, Jan. 9, 1981.
161. But see the discussion of how the Court member's votes now seem to
stand on the burden of proof issue in note 132 supra.
162. See note 169 infra.
cies, the present regulatory defect of ponderous substance-by-
substance promulgation of standards will persist. Parties op-
posed to the standards supported by the policies of the Cancer
Standard will flood the courts with arguments that there is indeed
adequate quantitative data to base "rough" risk estimates.
The resistance to OSHA's Cancer Standard seems to be based
in part upon a misconceived notion of its purposes.163 Opponents
look at the benzene standard's costs, and shudder at the prospect
of those costs multiplied by the two hundred and seventy-one oc-
cupational carcinogens presently on OSHA's "suspect" list. 6 4 As
pointed out by the minority in American Petroleum Institute,
however, such a "draconian" portrayal of the Cancer Standard is
unfounded.165
OSHA is trying to address itself to a crippling process of identi-
fication, administrative and scientific investigation, standard pro-
mulgation utilizing extensive notice and comment procedure, and
finally, bitter, drawn-out judicial review that might or might not
uphold the regulation. If the standards impose terrible economic
costs on the national economy, the costs imposed by the present
system of regulation tax the economy in still another, demoraliz-
ing way. As it presently stands, a massive and expensive federal
agency clumsily pursues its statutory responsibility accomplish-
ing relatively little. The costs of OSHA's inactivity are exacer-
bated by its failure to control the increasing number of
occupationally caused cancers that drain our economy for the cost
of medical care.
Even with a Generic Cancer Standard, there are safeguards
available to protect industry. Current proposals for a system of
regulatory budgets would force an agency like OSHA to make pri-
ority determinations.166 An agency's success would depend to a
great extent on how efficiently it performed its regulatory tasks.
Moreover, the regulatory budget would work well in conjunction
163. E.g. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 48 U.S.L.W. 5022, 5032, n.51 (1980);
see text accompanying notes 116-120 supra.
164. De Long, Benzene Exposes Workers to Unresolved Issues, LEGAL TIMES
WASH. D.C., Sept. 8, 1980, at 44, col. 3:
If our society spends $500 million to control benzene, this money is not
available to replenish the nation's capital stock, for example, or to
purchase goods that people may value more than risk avoidance. If one
multiplies this amount by the almost infinite number of risks in the world,
the zero-risk approach translates into compulsory pauperization.
165. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct at 2891 (Marshall, J., dissenting):
"Contrary to the plurality's suggestion, the Secretary did not rely blindly on some
draconian carcinogen policy."
166. E.g., Moss, Time to Regulate the Regulators-And Place the Blame on Con-
gress, NAT'L L.J., May 12, 1980, at 25 (Discussion by Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, D-Texas,
of S. 51, (1980), a bill to introduce a regulatory budget).
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with a Cancer Standard. OSHA could move quickly through the
process of identifying all the occupational heatlh and safety risks
it confronts and has authority to regulate, and then address its
limited resources to the risks on a priority basis. The agency
would not find it useful to waste resources on insignificant risks
where greater ones exist. Furthermore, where the agency can
know in advance the range of substances it can regulate, it might
save industry and the economy money by developing comprehen-
sive plans for regulation of multiple carcinogens.
It should also be remembered that section 6(b) (5) standards
are not permanent fixtures. They are based on "the best available
evidence" and can be amended as new, more accurate informa-
tion is discovered.167 The OSH Act also provides for a system of
variances, that delay individual compliance for good cause.168
Likewise, enforcement proceedings before the Occupational
Health and Safety Review Commission, an independent commis-
sion, provide industry with additional procedural protections.169
Finally, the Cancer Standard might offer some stability to the
reviewing courts' participation in standard promulgation. The ju-
dicial struggles that have centered around permissible exposure
levels during OSHA's history have been misguided. Complex
questions of science have been tangled up in the adversarial sys-
tem and have thwarted systematic agency response to health dan-
gers. Employees have paid most dearly for this by risking their
physical welfare. The people and the nation have paid by funding
an inefficient agency, and industry has suffered from inconsistent
decisions and policies that make their development and growth
unpredictable. Unfortunately, American Petroleum Institute only
clouds the future of OSHA's regulatory approach to carcinogens.
GEORGE B. BLACKMAR
167. See 29 C.F.R. § 1990.111(i).
168. OSH Act § 6(b) (6), (d), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (6), (d) (1970).
169. OSH Act § 10(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a), (b). See Berger & Riskin, Eco-
nomic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 EcoL. L.Q. 285, 301-11 for a general discus-
sion of OSHRC's review of OSHA's enforcement of standards.

